1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
2	EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA ALEXANDRIA DIVISION
3	IN RE: GRAND JURY SUBPOENA) Case 1:19-dm-00003
4	FOR CHELSEA MANNING)) Alexandria, Virginia) March 5, 2019
5) 9:34 a.m.) Pages 1 - 32
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7	TRANSCRIPT OF UNDER SEAL HEARING
8	BEFORE THE HONORABLE CLAUDE M. HILTON
9	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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25	COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION OF STENOGRAPHIC NOTES
	UNDER SEAL

APPEARANCES: 1 FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: 3 THOMAS W. TRAXLER, ESQUIRE GORDON D. KROMBERG, ESQUIRE 4 TRACY D. MCCORMICK, ESQUIRE KELLEN S. DWYER, ESQUIRE 5 OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY 2100 Jamieson Avenue 6 Alexandria, Virginia 22314 (703) 299-37007 NICOLAS HUNTER, ESQUIRE 8 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE NATIONAL SECURITY DIVISION 9 600 E Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20004 10 (202) 307-517611 FOR CHELSEA E. MANNING: 12 SANDRA C. FREEMAN, ESQUIRE LAW OFFICE OF SANDRA FREEMAN 5023 West 120th Avenue, Suite 280 13 Broomfield, Colorado 80020 14 (720) 593-900415 MOIRA MELTZER-COHEN, ESQUIRE, PRO HAC VICE LAW OFFICE OF MOIRA MELTZER-COHEN 16 277 Broadway, Suite 1501 New York, New York 10007 17 (347) 248-677118 CHRISTOPHER LEIBIG, ESQUIRE LAW OFFICE OF CHRISTOPHER LEIBIG 19 114 North Alfred Street Alexandria, Virginia 22314 20 (703) 683-431021 22 23 2.4 25 UNDER SEAL

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THE CLERK: Case No. 19-3, In Re Grand Jury
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   Subpoena Regarding Chelsea Manning.
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             MR. TRAXLER: Good morning, Your Honor.
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  Tommy Traxler on behalf of the United States.
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  at counsel table is Gordon Kromberg, Tracy McCormick,
  Kellen Dwyer, and Nicolas Hunter also on behalf of the
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  United States, Your Honor.
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             THE COURT: All right.
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             MR. LEIBIG: Good morning, Judge.
  Leibig for Ms. Manning. With me is Sandra Freeman and
11 Moira Meltzer-Cohen.
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             As an initial matter, Judge, I would ask that
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  you grant my motion to move Ms. Meltzer-Cohen pro hac
  vice for this matter.
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             THE COURT: All right. The motion is
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  granted.
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             MR. LEIBIG: Thank you, sir.
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             MS. FREEMAN: Good morning, Your Honor.
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  Sandra Freeman on behalf of Ms. Manning.
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             As a preliminary matter, I would request the
  Court first take up our motion to unseal the pleadings,
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  and I would join that with a motion to open the
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  courtroom to the public.
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             THE COURT: All right.
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                           Yes, sir. I just wanted to
             MS. FREEMAN:
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     Rhonda F. Montgomery OCR-USDC/EDVA (703) 299-4599
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make sure the Court received the pleadings filed yesterday and the motion to unseal the pleadings.

THE COURT: I have.

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MS. FREEMAN: Judge, the matter before the Court today is not a matter occurring before the grand jury as we are not in front of the grand jury. The pleadings filed on Ms. Manning's behalf by counsel are not subject to the secrecy provisions in Rule 6(e), and Ms. Manning, as a witness, is not contemplated by the secrecy rules of 6(e).

The pleadings that we filed before you, specifically the motion to quash and the motion to unseal, do not contain any information about what has occurred before the grand jury. The United States Attorneys have not disclosed any of the information that they are prohibited from disclosing. The information that we have put before the Court within our pleadings and the information that we anticipate arguing to you today are all matters that are already within the sphere of public knowledge and that are not protected by the secrecy provisions within the law.

The motion to quash in and of itself is not something that is subject to the rules of grand jury secrecy.

We would ask the Court to authorize

disclosure of the pleadings filed as to Ms. Manning with the exception, of course, of Ms. Manning's declaration that is sealed and secret pursuant to the personal identifying detail provisions in the rules regarding redaction.

The rules around grand jury secrecy, first, I think are explicit in that they say that no one other than those listed in 6(e)(2)(B) shall be required to adhere to the rules of secrecy. The persons are identified, such as the attorneys for the government and court personnel. Of course, those people are subject to the provisions, and they are explicitly identified.

It's clear from the rule, from the advisory committee notes to the rule, and from case law from various circuits interpreting the rule that the witness herself, the pleadings that we have filed that do not contain nonpublic information regarding the nonpublic proceedings before the grand jury are not subject to those secrecy provisions.

What we are asking today is that the Court authorize unsealing of the motion to quash filed on Ms. Manning's behalf, authorize unsealing of the motion to unseal, and we would further ask the Court open the courtroom to the public for arguments on these matters.

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Of course, the public has no right to be present for the grand jury itself. The public and press have no First Amendment right of access. We are not requesting that the public or the press or even counsel have any access to the actual proceedings before the grand jury.

Our request here is for these proceedings specifically before you regarding whether or not to quash Ms. Manning's subpoena, regarding whether or not **∥**to unseal the pleadings, that those matters the public does have a particularized interest and a right of 12 access to be present. Ms. Manning has a right for the public to be able to be present for specifically these arguments that do not involve protected information and material.

There are questions and tests set out. have to show a particularized need and that those materials were present and opening of the courtroom would be needed to avoid injustice at other proceedings. This is another proceeding being contemplated by the rule. We are not asking the Court to open up the proceedings of the grand jury itself. We are asking that these proceedings particularly be opened. The request has been narrowly tailored as to these pleadings.

So based on all of that, we would ask that the Court be opening the pleadings and the public information, the information that has already been disclosed and revealed by both the government and by socialists throughout the past decade, to be accessible by the public and the hearing as well.

THE COURT: All right.

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Thank you, Your Honor. MR. TRAXLER:

As a preliminary matter, I want to observe that the government has not received a copy of the motion to unseal. So we don't have the benefit of 12 Presponding to the specific arguments that were in that pleading. But instead, we just heard about it today from Ms. Manning's counsel. We would oppose Ms. Manning's request to open the courtroom and to unseal the pleadings in this matter.

First, I want to take up opening the courtroom. Rule 6(e)(5), Your Honor, states, and I quote, that aside from criminal contempt proceedings, the Court must close any hearing to the extent necessary to prevent disclosure of a matter occurring before a grand jury.

We would submit, Your Honor, that this entire hearing concerns a matter occurring before a grand jury, and that is a subpoena that the grand jury has

issued for Ms. Manning to testify in connection with a grand jury investigation. That investigation is ongoing. It's hard to imagine, Your Honor, how we can have an effective hearing this morning without discussing or potentially discussing matters that are occurring before a grand jury.

Moreover, the pleadings and the hearing directly involve matters occurring before the grand jury. Rule 6(e) would preclude the government from confirming Ms. Manning's subpoena, a matter occurring before a grand jury; Ms. Manning's immunity order, another order that was issued in connection with a matter occurring before a grand jury; and other items.

So practically speaking, Your Honor, we wouldn't be able to have an effective hearing if the government is constantly evaluating under Rule 6(e) whether it can say certain things because the media is present in the courtroom. So we would submit, Your Honor, that Rule 6(e)(5) answers the question this morning, and that is the hearing, because it addresses a matter occurring before the grand jury, should be closed.

With respect to sealing, Your Honor, I would direct the Court's attention to the following subsection of Rule 6(e), and that's Rule 6(e)(6). That

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specifically states that records, orders, and subpoenas relating to grand jury proceedings must be kept under seal to the extent and as long as necessary to prevent the unauthorized disclosure of a matter occurring before a grand jury.

Your Honor, at the outset, we would submit, having not had the benefit of receiving the pleading that Ms. Manning filed yesterday, that the Court should defer ruling on unsealing at this time. There is no reason to go to a rushed judgment today. There is too much at stake, and whatever the Court's ruling is, it would likely be appealed to the Fourth Circuit.

Instead, let the parties brief this issue in due course, and that would give the parties an opportunity to work through these issues. It would also give the Court an opportunity to make a considered judgment in light of full briefing and the parties' views on the issue.

But if the Court is inclined to rule today, we would oppose unsealing all of the pleadings and papers that they request be unsealed.

Just to reiterate, the fact that Ms. Manning has been subpoenaed to testify in an ongoing grand jury proceeding is a matter occurring before the grand jury.

Again, the fact that she's been granted immunity is

directly contemplated in the advisory notes of Rule 6(e)(5) as being a matter that should be sealed, as being paper that should be sealed, and is a matter occurring before the grand jury. Therefore, the briefs that talk about that immunity order and the subpoena, those are related to an ongoing grand jury proceeding and should be sealed.

Thank you, Your Honor.

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THE COURT: All right. Well, I find that Rule 6(e)(5) and Rule 6(e)(6) require that we go forward with these matters at this point in time under 12 seal and also that the courtroom be closed for the 13 hearing.

The government hasn't had time to respond to your brief. I will give time for you all to look Ifurther at this issue as to what ought to be unsealed or not unsealed.

As far as the hearing on the motion to quash this grand jury subpoena, that's a matter before the grand jury, and we'll go forward with the courtroom closed.

MS. MELTZER-COHEN: Good morning, Your Honor. So thank you for hearing us this morning, Your Honor.

We understand that this is a robust and complicated motion, so I will try to simplify it. UNDER SEAL

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is an omnibus motion. The motion to quash is an omnibus motion that contains several smaller motions within it, many of which contain arguments that interact with each other or are somewhat overlapping.

Each of the quash motions in our omnibus motion represents an independent legal basis that would constitute just cause for objecting to the subpoena generally. Each of these quash motions might also constitute grounds to object to individual questions that would be propounded before the grand jury.

So to the extent that the government has said that some of these motions may be premature, they're not entirely incorrect because it is true that we can't litigate these issues today with respect to questions that we have not yet heard. But these motions may be appropriate both today and then, again, revisited after Ms. Manning hears questions.

THE COURT: Aren't you conceding the government's position in regard to what questions may be asked? I don't know how I can rule on that. I have no idea what questions are there. You don't have any idea what questions are there. Clearly, we can't go forward with today; can we?

MS. METZLER-COHEN: Judge, I'm sorry. Your Honor, what I'm suggesting and I believe what the law

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says is we can object to the subpoena generally, and we can also, you know, in a later hearing object on similar or the same grounds to individual questions.

So what's not premature here are the following issues: With regard to Ms. Manning's Fifth Amendment privileges, it would appear that the government has worked to moot this issue by not only securing an immunity order from you but by securing a parallel order from the military.

So, first, as we said in the motion, we do have concerns about a perjury trap. Ms. Manning gave extensive and truthful testimony at her court marshal. If you look at the document that's appended to the government's reply, you will, in fact, see the painstaking detail with which Ms. Manning accounted for each instance of her conduct. I mean down to file names, Your Honor.

So if the government intends to question her about any of the same matters, which the reply seems to suggest they do, she's sort of faced with the choice of reiterating her previous answers, which the government appears not to accept, or being untruthful, which she refuses to do.

Ms. Manning has not given and would not give untruthful testimony. However, since her prior

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testimony made clear that she acted alone and since we
  have been advised that she is herself not a target in
  this investigation, it would appear that the government
  may harbor an interest in undermining her previous
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  testimony since it doesn't inculpate anyone else who
  might be a target.
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             THE COURT: Aren't you getting back where we
  were just a minute ago? You're saying if or what.
  There's no way of knowing this. This is just entire
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  speculation. I can't base a ruling on that.
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             MS. METZLER-COHEN: Okay. Judge, I think
12 |I -- I think it's important for me to make the record
13 of the argument here. So if you'll --
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             THE COURT: Well, you have that in your
  papers, but go ahead and make your argument quickly.
  It seems to me we're right at the same ground we were
  before.
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             MS. METZLER-COHEN: Okay. I will attempt to
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  be clear and quick.
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             THE COURT: Well, that is, we can't base a
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  decision on that.
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             MS. METZLER-COHEN:
                                 Okay.
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             THE COURT: I mean, you can conjure up
24 Manything, or I could too. Who knows whether that's
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  going to happen or not?
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MS. METZLER-COHEN: Well, Judge, there are questions as to the subpoena as a whole that I think deserve to be heard and are ripe for review today. So, you know, if in case the subpoena has been propounded with an interest in either coercing perjury or attempting to build a case against Ms. Manning for perjury, you know, in order to undermine her as a potential defense witness, since the immunity order can't immunize that potential perjury, she retains an interest in not testifying.

I do also want to clarify for the record that the government correctly repeated my statement of the law with respect to foreign prosecution. It is absolutely the case that the Supreme Court ruled in Balsys, which both of us cite, that the immunity order and immunity orders coextensive with the Fifth Amendment privilege and that that privilege extends only to domestic and not foreign prosecution. I am not suggesting that it does extend to foreign prosecution but that because the immunity order does not extend to foreign prosecution, it does create an unresolved problem for Ms. Manning, which I think is worth considering.

With respect to constitutional rights, it appears to be the government's position that this

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challenge is premature. While we, of course, agree that we can't make arguments today about grand jury questions that we haven't yet heard, there are other issues with respect to the subpoena generally, again, that can be heard today.

As mentioned, Ms. Manning has disclosed to the government everything she can about her involvement In the 2010 disclosures for which she took full responsibility. If the government wishes to question her further about these issues, as I said before, we 11 have concerns about a perjury trap.

But maybe they have interest in asking her about subjects beyond those disclosures, and that would 14 be very concerning because Ms. Manning has no linformation material or relevant to any other violation of federal law. So we can only conclude at that point Ithat the government wants to ask questions of Ms. Manning that do not implicate any crimes. That would be information to which the grand jury is not entitled because it would be an obvious violation of her First Amendment expressive and associational 22 rights.

As we discussed in our pleadings, there is a 24 long and well-documented history with grand juries being used for improper purposes, specifically to

disrupt communities of activists and journalists who are engaged in lawful and constitutionally valuable activities. Ms. Manning is not bringing this up in order to assert the constitutional rights of 4 journalists or other third parties but to ensure that 5 the issue of the grand jury's purpose here and the 6 7 issue of this particular subpoena here is duly considered. 8

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The administration has been very publicly hostile to the press. This administration has also been very publicly hostile to Ms. Manning. The highest 12 ranking government officials have called her out by name and called for her reincarceration and expressed displeasure at her release. So tremendous executive pressure has been brought to bear on issues that are implicated by this grand jury with respect to the press, and tremendous executive pressure has been brought to bear more specifically on Ms. Manning, who is the subject of this individual subpoena.

So we think it makes sense for Ms. Manning to be worried about a possible improper motive for this subpoena in general. We believe that that issue is ripe today.

We have, of course, expressed our concerns about the potential for a perjury trap and our concerns UNDER SEAL

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Ithat this grand jury subpoena is being used to undermine Ms. Manning potentially as a witness, put her in jeopardy of contempt and reincarceration, or to go on a fishing expedition to constitutionally protected activity.

As the government noted, there is a presumption of regularity that attaches to grand jury proceedings. There is -- either must be a real compelling need for judicial intervention into grand jury proceedings, but we think that's present here. Because once evidence of abuse has been introduced, it 12 lis the prosecution that must demonstrate that regularity.

Ms. Manning, of course, is not in a position to introduce highly specific concrete evidence of abuse. But given the kind of attention that she has been subject to, it is absolutely reasonable for her to bulk at being compelled to cooperate with a government that has been actively and publicly hostile to her. believe that the prosecution should be called upon to establish the regularity, not simply this grand jury proceeding but specifically of this subpoena.

The electronic surveillance motion we believe is also ripe for review but might also be appropriately revisited after questioning before the grand jury.

Unlawful electronic surveillance, if used to propound a subpoena or any question before a grand jury, would constitute just cause excusing testimony. The subject of covert surveillance is rarely well positioned to prevent overwhelming evidence of that surveillance, and Ms. Manning is no exception.

That is why the law is well settled that making even an allegation or at most, I think, in this circuit a colorable claim of electronic surveillance is sufficient to trigger the government's obligation to either affirm or deny that electronic surveillance took place. This is not a particularly onerous task for them, and we think it's worth noting that the government did not make such a denial in their reply.

The government's argument here on the law is a little misplaced. Ms. Manning certainly has standing to object to any electronic surveillance that would have led to -- any unlawful electronic surveillance of her that would have led to this subpoena or to questions that may occur before it.

The case that is cited by both Ms. Manning and the government, *U.S. v. Apple*, makes clear that a cognizable claim -- and this is a quote from the case -- need be no more than a mere assertion but must have a colorable basis.

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While this circuit may overwhelmingly find that government denials of electronic surveillance are sufficient to defeat this kind of claim, making a colorable claim suffices to trigger the government's obligation. So the government would be expected to make the requisite canvas of agencies and state their unambiguous denials for the record.

So, Your Honor, all we're asking for here is a very simple answer. You know, to start with, if -you know, if you ask the government now, "Are you aware of any electronic surveillance, and if he says, "Yes, 12 we're done, you know, we know and we can go from there. If he says no, then all the government has to do is make the relevant inquiries of the federal agencies, and either they say yes, this kind of surveillance happened, or no, it didn't.

Your Honor, we also included a motion to linstruct the grand jury to which the government objects. It is our position -- and I think it is noncontroversial -- that the grand jurors are entitled to fully understand not only the full scope of their rights and power, but also the rights afforded to a witness called to testify before them. There is nothing in our set of proposed grand jury instructions that is legally questionable. Each proposed

instruction is a simple statement of fact regarding the
powers of the grand jury or the rights of the witness.

In that the government painted such a plainly
educational document as in some way controversial is
perplexing and does not necessarily bode well for the
grand jury's independence.

Your Honor, there is also a motion for

disclosure of prior statements that I do want to clarify in light of the government's response to us. The government has objected to our request for disclosure of prior statements based on the admittedly stringent rules around disclosing grand jury testimony. They are correct also that there is no prior grand jury testimony to disclose. I want to clarify that with respect to the law on which this request is based, I am arguing here by analogy. Presumably, nongrand jury testimony or other statements that are not bound by Rule 6 would be significantly less tightly controlled than grand jury testimony.

In preliminary discussions with the government, counsel was given to understand that the government believes Ms. Manning may have made prior statements that were either incorrect or in some way at variance with her prior statements or testimony.

Ms. Manning, of course, has raised concerns that this

grand jury may be working toward eliciting contradictory statements or worse, and her perceptions have not been helped by the public resentment that has been expressed by other actors in the government. one way in which the government might make a show of good faith here would be to disclose whatever prior statements they seem to be relying on to justify the subpoena.

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It is in no way a violation of grand jury secrecy to reveal to a witness statements that they themselves are said to have made. Doing so could have 12 many collateral benefits, including clarifying authorship and attribution and refreshing the witness' recollection. There is certainly no law that forbids such disclosure, and there does appear to be law both encouraging and compelling it.

The final component of our omnibus motion concerns our motion to disclose ministerial documents, and Ms. Freeman will speak to that now. I thank you, Your Honor.

MS. FREEMAN: Thank you, Your Honor. briefly, I would reincorporate everything that I said regarding our motion to unseal in that I think that the law that applies in terms of determining what is a matter that occurs before the grand jury also applies

to this when you're looking at the analysis under Rule 6(e). Cases are clear not only from the Ninth Circuit but from circuits across the country that documents reflecting the commencement and termination, reflecting that the grand jury has been -- a term has 5 been extended, records of impanelment to include manuals, procedures, and the impanelment instructions, that none of those issues have been held to be matters occurring before the grand jury. It would not affect 10 deliberations of a grand jury for us to know them. It 11 would not potentially undermine the integrity of the 12 investigation or any witness' testimony to the grand 13 jury itself. 14 THE COURT: You have available the impanelment of this grand jury. 15 16 MS. FREEMAN: No, sir, we do not. 17 THE COURT: It was impaneled in the 18 courtroom; wasn't it? 19 MS. FREEMAN: Judge, we do not have any of the documents reflecting the --21 THE COURT: Every grand jury I've impaneled 22 is done here in the open courtroom. 23 MS. FREEMAN: Understood, Judge. It is something that we would request access to. It appears 25 that the --

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THE COURT: I don't have it. I don't know if
 the clerk has it somewhere. There is some record of it
around here; isn't it? We don't impanel the grand jury
in secret.
          MS. FREEMAN: Judge, I think the issue is
that the -- what different courts and what different
clerks -- I think that it is understandable the clerks
would be acting in abundance of caution in refusing to
disclose some of those documents. It's our position
that things, such as an impanelment --
          THE COURT: While they're here, that's a
matter of information they may not give out, as to who
in particular is sitting on a grand jury.
          MS. FREEMAN: Yes. We would not be
requesting identifying information of who those grand
jurors are. These would just be documents basically
affecting the form and function, the mode, if you will,
of operation of this particular grand jury, not
regarding persons specifically on the grand jury, not
regarding witnesses who have testified before it, but
simply the -- what we would call the ministerial
documents.
          THE COURT:
                      That's impaneling the grand jury
and the termination of the grand jury when it's over.
          MS. FREEMAN:
                        Yes, sir.
                                   So that would be the
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It's not for any of the private information.
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  request.
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             THE COURT: All right. I understand.
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             MS. FREEMAN:
                           Thank you, Judge.
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             All right. Mr. Traxler.
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             MR. TRAXLER: Thank you, Your Honor.
             Your Honor, I'd like to pick up where the
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   Court began, and that is that Ms. Manning's arguments
  today are premature. As Your Honor noted, there has
  been no questioning yet. Ms. Manning has not appeared
  before the grand jury. So she can only speculate that
   the questions that might be asked would infringe upon
  the rights that she cites in her papers. As we
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  explained in our submission, such premature arguments
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  should be rejected. They should be normally answered
  on a question-by-question basis.
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             That said, Your Honor, we did argue
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  alternatively that this motion could be denied on its
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  merits. We would, in fact, urge the Court, if it's so
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  inclined, to deny the motion on its merits now.
  submit that the advantage of doing that would be it
  would hopefully reduce the number of times or eliminate
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   the parties coming up here during the actual grand jury
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  questioning to have the Court rule on various issues
  that have already been teed up in the papers.
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             So with that, I would like to address the
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merit arguments that Ms. Manning makes in her papers.

First would be her Fifth Amendment claim. As the

government argued in its papers, under Kastigar

(phonetic), there are no Fifth Amendment concerns here.

Ms. Manning has received full use and derivative use immunity for her testimony by both this Court and the

Department of the Army. Under Kastigar, that

The next argument Ms. Manning makes is a First Amendment claim, and the government submits, as we argued in our papers, that she has not asserted any legitimate First Amendment interest that could be infringed upon.

eliminates any Fifth Amendment concerns.

We submit, Your Honor, that the Supreme Court's decision in Branzburg v. Hayes forecloses

Ms. Manning's arguments. There the Supreme Court held that reporters had to testify in front of the grand jury even if it required them to disclose their sources. The reporters argued that they should have a First Amendment privilege to not have to go before the grand jury because disclosing those sources would have an inhibiting effect for reporters to recruit sources and it would diminish the flow of news. The Supreme Court rejected that argument. It held it was speculative. We submit, Your Honor, that Ms. Manning

has an even weaker claim than the reporters had in Branzburg.

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Even assuming the questioning in the grand jury were to touch on the disclosures from 2009 and 2010, Ms. Manning had no First Amendment rights with respect to those disclosures. As the government noted in its papers, Ms. Manning was a government insider who signed a nondisclosure agreement, and under well-established precedent, that means that she had no First Amendment rights.

Ms. Manning talks about the concerns that the questioning would have for journalists. I'll say at the outset: Certainly, Ms. Manning seems to be speculating that at some future date the grand jury may return an indictment that she speculates might violate the First Amendment. That's not a legitimate basis, Your Honor, for a fact witness to refuse to testify in front of the grand jury. If it was, the whole grand jury process would break down if every fact witness who came in front of the grand jury could speculate that the crimes being investigated might violate someone else's constitutional rights. She has no standing to make that argument.

Next, Your Honor, Ms. Manning argues that the grand jury subpoena was improperly motivated, and we

emphasize to the Court that Ms. Manning's speculations are exactly that. They are mere speculations. As the cases that we cited in our papers show, speculation and conjecture is not enough to rebut the long-standing presumption that the grand jury acts reasonably and properly when it issues a subpoena.

Your Honor, I want to address in particular one thing that we heard throughout counsel's argument, and that is the speculation that the government issued a grand jury subpoena just so it could catch

Ms. Manning in a so-called perjury trap. Again, we emphasize to the Court that's just speculation as to what the government's motives are. There's no basis for that.

We also submit, Your Honor, that that argument is premature. Any concerns about an alleged perjury trap are properly raised if there was some charge for perjury at a future date. It's not a justification for a fact witness to refuse to go in front of the grand jury.

Finally, Your Honor, we submit that

Ms. Manning has not provided the Court with a colorable basis for believing that the government has -- I'm sorry -- that she might have been subjected to unlawful electronic surveillance. As the Court noted in its

papers, there's certain threshold requirements that Ms. Manning has to meet to even trigger the government's obligation to affirm or deny or generally respond to her allegations. She has to come forward with something more than mere suspicion that she might have been subjected to unlawful electronic surveillance.

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If you read her papers, she clearly has not done that. You can tell by the way she couches her argument throughout her papers, that she has reason to believe, that she believes she might have been subject 12 Ito unlawful electronic surveillance. The truth is she has no idea, and she is using this statute improperly as an attempt to get discovery from the government. Therefore, the government submits that Ms. Manning is not entitled to even that threshold affirmance or denial from the government about whether there is any such surveillance in this case.

There is one last topic I want to touch on, and that's the ministerial documents issue that counsel raised just a moment ago. I would emphasize that, as Judge Ellis noted in the decision we cited in our papers, the Fourth Circuit has not adopted the approach of the cases that Ms. Manning cites. We submit that Ms. Manning, if there is anything done in open court,

should figure out on her own what's available. If it's not available because it was not done in open court, we submit she should not receive those materials.

There is no right of access to the grand jury proceedings. Ms. Manning has provided no justification or no need or has not provided any justification or explained why she needs those documents. In light of that, we submit to the Court that the general rule of secrecy should apply here and she should not receive any documents relating to the grand jury proceedings that have not otherwise already been done in open court.

So with that, Your Honor, we would rest on our papers for the rest of the arguments. We submit that the Court should deny the motion to quash. It's a bedrock principal, a long-standing principal in our jurisprudence that the grand jury is entitled to every person's evidence. We submit that Ms. Manning is no different. She has been lawfully subpoenaed to testify in the grand jury. The Court has ordered her to testify already fully and truthfully in front of the grand jury. She's been fully immunized with use and derivative use testimony -- I'm sorry -- immunity in connection with her testimony. Like every other citizen in this nation, Ms. Manning should be required

to appear before the grand jury pursuant to the subpoena and to testify fully and truthfully. submit that there is no reason to treat Ms. Manning differently than we would any other civilian in responding to a grand jury subpoena.

Thank you, Your Honor.

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THE COURT: All right. Well, as I've listened to the arguments here, it's almost like listening to lawyers discussing a case that they're looking into and finding out what issues are involved. This whole thing is just really speculation about what 12 may or may not happen. Most of this is really premature except your issue of the Fifth Amendment. Ifind that you have no rights in that regard because of the immunity order that I've entered, and you have one Ifrom the military. I also find that there's no First Amendment implication here that's been represented to me or that I can even get my hands around to rule on. There just isn't anything.

There's no evidence presented of any improper motive. You've raised questions about what might or might not be the motive. I don't have anything in front of me that would require me to rule on it.

Also, your motion to instruct the grand jury, I see no need to instruct the grand jury.

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Your motion for disclosure of prior
  statements, that's going to be denied as well.
  Disclosing the ministerial documents here, I don't see
   any relevancy that's been presented to me that would
  require that at all.
             So with that said, your motion to quash the
  subpoena will be denied.
             Now, I don't know if you want to set a time
  Iframe on this unsealing or whatever it is, time to
  respond to it. I mean, I'll deal with that.
             MR. TRAXLER: Your Honor, the government
12 would request two weeks to prepare a response.
  mentioned, we still need to receive the papers from
  Ms. Manning and then time to formulate a response.
             THE COURT: All right. Why don't you all get
  together on that. Two weeks sounds reasonable.
  notice it to a Friday, and I'll deal with it when you
  get ready to argue it again.
             MR. TRAXLER: We will. Thank you, Your
20 Honor.
             MR. KROMBERG: If I may, Your Honor. Our
22 Itime before the grand jury is tomorrow at 9:30. We ask
  \parallelthe Court -- we just let the Court know that so in case
  these issues recur tomorrow or new issues come up
  tomorrow, that's when we're expecting to be before the
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grand jury.
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             THE COURT: Well, I hope that I have dealt
  with enough of them that we won't have any problems
  like that. If not, I'll be around.
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             MR. KROMBERG: Thank you, Your Honor.
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             THE COURT: All right. We'll adjourn until
 7
   tomorrow morning at 9:30.
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                       Time: 10:15 a.m.
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        I certify that the foregoing is a true and
22
    accurate transcription of my stenographic notes.
23
24
25
                             Rhonda F. Montgomery, CCR, RPR
                          UNDER SEAL
     Rhonda F. Montgomery OCR-USDC/EDVA (703) 299-4599
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